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Dear Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
It is  both  a  pleasure  and  an  honour  to  welcome  you 
here this  evening.  We are grateful that you have been able 
to accept  our invitation to come  to  the second Jean Monnet 
Lecture,  which  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament, 
Emilio Colombo, has  kindly agreed to deliver today, on Mr. 
Jean  Monnet's  90th birthday. 
We  are  deeply  grateful,  Mr.  President,  that  you  have 
agreed  to come here today.  There is  no need  to introduce 
you  to an  audience which, while it has not hitherto had the 
pleasure of making your acquaintance personally, knows how 
well you have deserved of your country and of the European 
Community.  I  shall not mention all  the posts you have held 
in  various  governments.  I  should  like  only  to recall  that 
for ten years  you  bore the heavy responsibilities of Minister 
for  the  Treasury,  before  becoming,  for  two  years,  head 
of government.  For two years  you  have chaired  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament,  and  in  a  few  months  you  will  have  the 
great  satisfaction  of  seeing  it  elected  by  direct  universal 
suffrage.  The holding  of  these  elections  is  largely  thanks 
to  the  efforts  of  the  Parliament  over  which  you  preside 
and to your personal efforts  in your high office. 
1 I do not wish to make all  those who have come here to 
hear you wait any longer, Mr. President.  I  should like only 
to  read  you  the  telegram  we have  just  received  from  Mr. 
Jean  Monnet: 
" At the  time when  you  are  gathering to listen  to Mr. 
Emilio  Colombo,  I  wish  to  tell  you  that  my  thoughts  are 
with you  and  that  I  wish  the greatest  possible  success  to 
this  meeting  held  under  the  auspices  of  your  European 
Institute.  Since  Mr.  Roy  Jenkins'  lecture  last  year  new 
progress has been made towards the monetary union in which 
he had called  on our countries  to come  together.  Now it 
is  the direct  elections  to the European Parliament  that are 
the  next  great  step  for  us  to  take  together.  Please  pass 
my  best wishes  to  my  friend  Emilio Colombo,  who  chairs 
that  Parliament  with  great  authority,  and  my  greetings  to 
your guests  today. 
Yours  most  cordially, 
JEAN  MONNET " 
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TELEGRAM  SENT 
TO MR.  JEAN MONNET 
" On behalf of  all  those gathered here  at the European 
University  Institute today,  your  90th birthday,  to hear  the 
second lecture in the series bearing your name, we thank you 
with  all  our  hearts  for  everything  you  have  done  for  the 
union of our peoples. 
We  send  you .  our  best  wishes  and  assure  you  of  our 
devotion to the cause which you have served in so exemplary 
a  manner. 
Yours  in friendship  and respect, 
EMILIO  COLOMBO 
MAx  KoHNSTAMM" 
3 LECTURE  BY  MR.  EMILIO  COLOMBO 
President of the European  Parliament 
For years we have all, with our own responsibilities and 
to  the extent  of  our own  capacities,  been  involved  in  the 
difficult  process  leading  towards  European  Union.  For  us 
it is both an ideal and a political objective to which we have 
committed  our  generation  and  which  we  hope  will  merit 
equal attention and commitment from succeeding generations. 
Our belief in and our work towards European Union derive 
not only from the accepted currents of our political thought, 
but also  from  the  conviction  which  has  grown  particularly 
since the war of the inability of individual states to cope with 
the inevitable process of internationalization of the economy 
or  with  the  almost  exclusive  domination  of  the  ' global ' 
powers  in  maintaining  the often  fragile  balance  of  interna-
tional policy in  these times. 
We have  no  reason  for  complacency  about  the  present 
state of Europe in spite of the efforts we have made and the 
network of links which we  have developed  and  which have 
made  us  aware  that there can  he no  turning back. 
We  are  strengthened  in  this  belief  by  our  experience 
which has  shown us  that as  Europeans we can make a real 
impact when we manage  to find  the right  joint solutions  to 
the  problems  of  our  time. 
4 In  these  difficult  times,  in  spite  of  the  economic  and 
political crises into which our countries and the Community 
are plunged, we can  see  the truth of Jean Monnet's remarks 
when he  pointed out that it was  at  times  of crisis  that the 
most decisive steps were taken towards European integration. 
This  is  one  of  those  times  when  the  crisis  forces  us  to 
act  and  strengthens  our  conviction,  even  in  the  face  of 
effective  opposition,  that  none  of  us  is  in  a  position  to 
overcome it alone. 
Europe is  thus  facing  a  number  of  important decisions 
which it cannot afford  to put off. 
We would face  the future with greater confidence if we 
could count on the vigilant efforts of Jean Monnet, to whom 
this lecture is  dedicated with respect and admiration on  the 
90th anniversary of his  birth, for he always  acted discreetly 
but  constructively  because  his  action  was  based  on  firm 
convictions  and  on his political genius. 
There  are  three  major  topics  facing  us  in  the  coming 
months  all  of vital  importance  and  all  interconnected:  the 
European  monetary  system,  the  enlargement  of  the  Com-
munities  and  the development of their institutions. 
We come  now  to the first  of  these  which  is  at a  very 
delicate and decisive stage at this very moment. 
Over the three-year period 1975-1977 the rate of growth 
of  the main  industrialized  countries,  with  the  exception  of 
the United States, fell  sharply. 
A  comparison  between  the  average  rates  of  growth  in 
the gross domestic products of the most highly industrialized 
countries  of  Europe  - and  these  include  West  Germany, 
France,  the  United  Kingdom  - in  1975-1977  and  the 
preceding fifteen years shows dearly that the rate of progress 
towards higher levels  of prosperity fell  by almost 50%. 
Analyses  carried  out by  a  wide  variety  of  bodies  have 
brought  to  light  a  number  of  reasons  for  this  significant 
slowing  down  of  expansion  in  countries  which  after  the 
5 Second  World  War showed  their  ability  to  sustain  a  high 
level  of  growth  in  production  and  employment,  while 
maintaining  sufficient  internal  and  external  stability. 
At the beginning  of the  1970's cost pressures  began  to 
be  felt.  These  were  caused  by  policies  of  granting  wage 
increases without any corresponding increase in productivity 
and led to a redistribution of funds to labour from  the other 
factors  of production. 
Weakness  in  internal  investment  demand,  which  came 
about  in  most  countries  as  a  result  of  the  deteriorating 
economic situation of companies, was  dealt with through an 
increase in public expenditure aimed at expanding the market 
and  encouraging  industry  to  continue  to  invest. 
Since the increase in public expenditure was felt primarily 
in current expenditure,  on the consumer side,  it aggravated 
the imbalance which was developing between production and 
consumption and  all  countries  had to introduce deflationary 
policies to attempt to preserve balance on the domestic front, 
in prices,  and internationally in  the balance of payments. 
It  is  difficult  to  control  the  ordered  development  of 
economic  systems  by means  of monetary intervention.  The 
money  supply  is  controlled  not  so  much  by  the monetary 
authorities as  by growth in wages  and government decisions 
on  public  expenditure. 
Only  when  internal  and  external  imbalances  become 
excessive do the monetary authorities intervene with drastic 
measures which often go beyond what is necessary and bring 
about  deflationary  effects  which  by  their very  nature cause 
pressures in the opposite direction requiring a reversal of the 
previous decisions. 
The  much  criticized  stop-go  policies  resulted  from  the 
impossibility of controlling the development of the economy 
and the consequent recourse to monetary measures when real 
imbalances became severe. 
This  is  what happened between  1968  and  1973  in  the 
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highly  industrialized  countries  of  the  world  and  led  the 
United  States  to  declare  the  dollar  inconvertible  on  16 
August  1971. 
The situation grew even more serious at the end of 1973 
when, in the absence-of a new international monetary order, 
the  laborious  efforts  to  achieve  it  were  upset  by  the 
quadrupling of oil prices.  Many blamed the failure  to deal 
in  a  concerted  manner  with  the deflationary  effects  of  the 
increase in oil prices on the lack of political cohesion among 
the countries of the West.  Many others felt that international 
solidarity  could not find  expression  in a common  policy  as 
long  as  it was  unclear  where  the  oil  producing  countries 
would deposit  their new found wealth not only in  the long 
term but even in the short term. 
At all events each ofthe countries of the western world 
and of the European Economic Community in particular acted 
independently  and  thus  had  to  fall  back  on  a  policy  of 
deflation  which  reduced  the  rate  of  growth  and  the  level 
of  employment.  These policies  had  different  effects  on the 
current  rate  of  unemployment  and  on  the  rate  of  un-
employment  expected  in  the  immediate  future.  This  led 
the  Community  countries  to  pursue  with  greater  severity 
policies  whose  prime  aim  was  the  stability  of  their  own 
currencies at home and abroad. 
The various policies were also influenced by the differing 
degrees  of  indexing  in  force  in  the  various  economies  and 
the  differing  ability  to  cope  with  the  real  problems  thus 
led to increasing  divergence  among currencies. 
In Europe the monetary zone eventually became a mark 
zone;  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Italy  had  to  leave 
the European snake.  Outside of Europe, the other monetary 
zone  was  the  dollar  area,  supported  by  the  largest  single 
national economy, that of the United States, which was 95% 
independent  of  international  trade.  Thus,  while  the  value 
of  the  dollar  gradually  came  to  reflect  the  United  States' 
7 need to cope with one of the highest levels of unemployment, 
the value of the mark reflected the situation in Germany and 
in  the other  countries  closely  linked  to it where  the  rate 
of  unemployment  was  low  and  the  dependence  of  the 
economy  on  foreign  trade  was  high,  which  meant  that 
monetary stability put a premium on growth and an increase 
in the level of employment. 
The currencies of other European countries - the pound, 
the French franc and the Italian lira- thus found themselves 
caught  between  the  need  to  support  a  minimum  level  of 
domestic  growth  - so  as  to  at  least  maintain  the  existing 
level  of  employment  - and  the  equally  pressing  need  to 
maintain  or  increase  international  trade  because  of  its 
influence  on  production  and  employment  at  home. 
The  disorder  and  instability  in  exchange  rates  which 
were both an effect and a cause of disruption in the economy 
eventually  made  the  disruption  even  greater  and  future 
prospects  more  uncertain. 
This  was  why  at the end  of  1977, in view  of the fact 
the United Kingdom  and  Italy had  succeeded  in  improving 
their  external  position  which  had  suffered  badly  in  the 
previous  eighteen  months,  the proposal was  put forward  to 
set  up  a  new  monetary  agreement  among  the countries  of 
the  European  Economic  Community. 
When the proposal was put forward, it was  stressed that 
if any  exchange  rate  mechanism  was  to  make  a  serious 
contribution  to  attaining  the  Community's  objectives  for 
economic  growth, it had  to be based  primarily  on  a closer 
convergence of the basic economic positions of the countries 
of  the Community  and  thus  on  a  more  stable  coordination 
of the economic policies  pursued by  the various  States.  It 
was· also stressed that a Community exchange  system would 
itself provide an impetus to the convergence of the economies 
by  laying  obligations  of  notification  and  discipline  on  eco-
nomic  operators through the fixing  of  the rate of exchange. 
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During  1978  there  was  a  growing  awareness  of  the 
need for  concerted  action  in  economic  policy  by  the  major 
industrialized  countries  - adapted  to suit  the capacities  of 
each country- which would be aimed at achieving balanced 
economic growth and a stabilization of exchange rates, since 
it had become clear that the manipulation of exchange rates 
was  insufficient  to  restore  stability  and  growth  to  the 
economies. 
Within the Community,  the persistence of the economic 
crisis which called into question the survival of the common 
market  and  all  that  had  been  achieved  with  such  great 
effort  encouraged  the  President  of  the  Commission,  Mr. 
Jenkins,  to give  a new impetus  to the  process  of  economic 
and  monetary  unification  with  the  important  speech  which 
he delivered last year in this very hall. 
This step was in line with the development of the world 
economy towards a multilateral system more in keeping with 
the  present  state  of  international  financial  relations  where 
the  concept  of individual  countries  playing  a  leading  role 
has  proved inadequate.  This initiative was  endorsed at the 
meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen last April, 
at which  the  Heads  of  State  or of Government  agreed  on 
the need to promote greater harmonization in the economies 
and  currencies  of  the BEC. 
The technical experts then went on to draw up alternative 
hypotheses  spreading  the  burden  in ·different  ways  among 
the participant countries.  The first  model  proposed  was  a 
new version of the current snake with a little more flexibility 
for  currencies  which  fluctuated  to  a  greater  degree;  the 
second  proposed  that  exchange  rates  be  fixed  not  on the 
basis  of  a  bilateral  parity  grid  but on  a  weighted  average 
inedx  expressed as  a European Unit of Account (equivalent 
to  the  actual  exchange  rate  fixed  on  the  basis . of  the 
geographical  distribution  of  the  foreign  trade  of  each 
country).  The  third  proposal  suggested  the  fixing  of  a 
9 reference  zone  for  the  three  countries  now  floating  inde-
pendently.  The Council of Finance Ministers, at its meeting 
of 19 June, expressed a preference for a system which could 
be applied to all  the currencies,  which  would impose equal 
obligations on all  participants  and  which would  reduce  the 
disparity  between  the  economies  of  the  member  countries 
without, however, preventing exchange  rates from  reflecting 
the  real  differences  which  do  persist.  They  felt  that  the 
system  should also  help to  improve  the international mone-
tary system by bringing greater stability into exchange rates 
between European currencies  and the other main currencies. 
Further indications about the nature of the new European 
monetary  organization  emerged  from  the European Council 
in  Bremen  last  July.  On  the  basis  of  a  Franco-German 
proposal the broad outline of the European Monetary System 
(EMS)  was  drawn up.  I  believe that this  is  a far reaching 
proposal  which  has  the  potential  to  achieve  the  benefits 
called  for  by  those  who  support  the  concept  of  regional 
currency  zones,  in  particular  the  reduction  of  the  dis-
advantages  arising  from  the  different  sizes  of  the  member 
countries,  a  greater  degree  of  economic  and  commercial 
integration  and  greater  political  solidarity.  These  benefits 
can  be  obtained if the  proposal  takes  due  account  of  the 
joint working of  the three constituent  elements:  agreement 
on  exchange  rates,  European  Monetary  Fund  (EMF)  and 
economic  measures  to  help  the  less  prosperous  economies. 
Only  if  these  three  fundamental  components  are  brought 
into play  together will the EMS  succeed. 
Realistically,  in  Bremen  provision  was  made  for  a 
transitional period during which the countries which are not 
members  of the snake  can enjoy  a  suitable degree  of  flexi-
bility, for  example wider margins  of fluctuation  and a suffi-
ciently generous credit scheme (before the European Mone-
tary Fund proper is  set  up),  to make it easier for  them  to 
observe the new commitments on exchange rates.  The more 
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flexible  application  of Community  commitments  during  the 
transitional period should not be seen as  a weakening of the 
status within the Community of the countries benefiting from 
it.  The  transitional  period  should  be  used  to implement 
national  and  Community  policy  designed  to  bring  the 
economies  of  the  Member  States  closer  together,  since 
experience has shown that without true economic convergence 
agreements  on  exchange  rates  will  be  short  lived.  The 
EMS  will  be  successful  only  if it  is  lasting,  that  is  to 
say  only if in the long term (and not just for a few months 
or for  one or two years)  all  the  member  countries  belong 
to it. 
Current  negotiations  have  brought  to  light  differences 
of opinion  on how the EMS  should be  implemented.  The 
annex to the Bremen communique places the ECU (European 
Currency  Unit)  at  the  heart  of  the  system  to be  used  to 
settle  payments  between  the  monetary  authorities  of  the 
EEC.  This statement of principle gave rise to two conflicting 
interpretations  leading  to  two  quite  different  methods  of 
operation.  In the  first  method,  the  ECU  is  the  currency 
of the system  and provides  a  reference  point on which  the 
central  exchange  rates  and  the  margins  of  fluctuation  are 
fixed.  Technically this method could be complex to operate. 
Based  on the technical formula  of the basket of currencies, 
the  ECU  is  made  up  of  fixed  quantities  of  Community 
currencies  whose  value  (and  consequently  ' weight '  in  the 
basket) varies  daily  with movements  in the exchange  rates. 
This  structure  produces  an  imbalanced  system  since  the 
strong currencies  have  wider scope  for fluctuation  than the 
weak currencies.  Moreover,  since  a currency can  reach  the 
limit of fluctuation while the others are not at  the opposite 
limit,  if the  country  which  is  out  of  line  buys  or  sells 
Community currencies on the exchange market this will give 
rise  to  unintentional debit  and  credit balances  in countries 
whose  currencies  have  been  used for  intervention  and will 
11 in  turn  involve  the  countries  which  are  in  credit  or  in 
deficit  in  unilateral  adjustments. 
The second method involves the fixing of bilateral parities 
- the ' parity grid ' sysem - on the basis of which the margins 
of fluctuation are fixed.  Although this method uses  the ECU 
to fix  the parities  it tends  to minimize  the use of the ECU 
itself and leads  to a system  similar to the snake,  which was 
not a very successful venture for  the Community as  a whole. 
The  conflict  between  the  two  approaches  led  to  the 
working  out  of  a  compromise  formula  which  incorporates 
the  practical  benefits  of  the  parity  grid  and  the  value  of 
the ECU for  identifying currencies  which  are  moving  away 
from  the average of those participating in  the system.  This 
practical  compromise  has  not,  however,  removed  the basic 
differences  which  persist  on  the  precise  definition  of  the 
obligations  of  countries  whose  currencies  get  out of  line. 
Some  countries  felt  that  it  would  be  sufficient  to  adopt 
simple  consultation  procedures  to  examine  the  economic 
policy  of  the  country  while  others  felt  that  there  was  a 
need  for  a more binding commitment  to introduce  suitable 
economic measures  and for specific obligations in relation to 
intervention and payment.  To solve this dilemma which cut 
across  the  traditional division  between the  countries  in  the 
snake  and  countries  with  floating  currencies,  a  middle  way 
was found which appears to have received wide support and 
on  which  experts  are  now  working,  whereby  the  country 
whose  currency  moves  out of  line  is  expected  to intervene 
on the market and is  obliged  to hold consultations with its 
partners to draw up measures  to correct the situation. 
While  respecting  the freedom  of  the  Member  States  to 
negotiate,  I  feel  it appropriate to  point out,  in  the  general 
interests  of the Community,  the  need  for  the system  to be 
workable,  in  other  words  to  be accepted  by  operators  as 
realistic  and  compatible  with  the differentials  between  the 
inflation  and  interest  rates  within  the  Community.  If the 
12 EMS  turned out to be merely  a  new  version of the snake, 
the tensions within the European and international monetary 
system would grow  more  acute.  We must avoid the errors 
of the past.  If we create a system which is destined to fail 
the Community would suffer doubly on the eve of its crucial 
expansion towards  the Mediterranean area.  There would be 
economic  tensions  and  a  sizeable  loss  of  reserves  in  the 
countries  with  weak  currencies,  and  exchange  rate  policy 
would  probably  be  shelved  alongside  the  instruments 
available  at  Community  level,  not to mention  the  cost  in 
political  terms  of  another failure  for  the future  of Europe. 
The EMS should have a degree of flexibility which should 
make  it possible  to vary  the central rates  to prevent  their 
being  held  at  unrealistic  levels  and  sufficient  room  for 
manoeuvre before  the bilateral margins  are  fixed.  But the 
objective of achieving a stable Community in which differences 
in  rates  of  inflation  will  gradually  disappear  should  be 
pursued in the medium term with determination although the 
gradual progress required by the socio-economic position we 
are  starting from  will not allow  us  to give  priority  to that 
aim  at  the  expense  of  employment  and  growth  without 
causing serious internal difficulties.  In other words we must 
not change  the  priorities  which  have  been  accepted  by  all 
our peoples  and  governments  during  this  post-war  period. 
For  these  reasons  the  system  should  be  balanced  in  its 
requirements for adjusting economic policies, leading the less-
favoured countries to pursue policies aimed at re-establishing 
balance on the domestic and foreign fronts and the countries 
in  surplus  to expand  their  domestic  economic  activity. 
On the European  Monetary  Fund  the  Bremen  commu-
nique proposes that the member countries should deposit the 
equivalent in gold and dollars of 20% of their reserves  and 
a  corresponding  amount  in  national  currencies.  In all  the 
Fund would  thus  have  available  resources  of  the  order  of 
50,000 million ECU's.  Since the creation of this Fund poses 
13 legal and political problems quite some time will have to be 
spent  on  the  technical  aspects:  two  years  according  to 
estimates  made  at Bremen.  However,  it  will  be possible 
to  provide  right  away  - by  expanding  and  if  necessary 
modifying  Community  machinery  - a  sufficient  volume  of 
credit  to  ensure  the  smooth  running  of  the  exchange 
system  during  the  transitional  phase.  Most  people  feel 
that  a  volume  of  resources  of  around  25,000  million 
ECU's would be a suitable amount.  Any lesser sum  would, 
in  my  view,  be  a  mere  cosmetic  operation  and  seriously 
damage the credibility of the EMS  as  regards  the agreement 
on  exchange  rates  at  its  most  crucial  moment,  when  it is 
just getting under way. 
I  would  also  like  to  stress  the  role  of  the  European 
Monetary  Fund  and  the  parallel  currency  it  would  issue 
in connection with the contributions from  the central banks, 
in the process of European unification.  The parallel currency 
issued by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund would 
initially constitute a sort of European special drawing right; 
its transformation from a unit of account into an instrument 
to  be  used  for  reserves  and  payments,  that  is  to  say  a 
currency  for  official  use,  is  an  important  step  towards  a 
common  European currency. 
On these aspects of the proposal there is also a difference 
of opinion between those who support a minimum  position 
and  would  like  to reduce  the  Fund  to little more  than  an 
accounting  instrument  and  those  who  want  to increase  its 
powers  and  scope  right  away. 
The fact  of drawing  attention  to the economic  realities 
of  the  member  countries  does  not  mean  supporting  the 
'laxist' view of the EMS.  Quite the contrary.  It is a realistic 
view  which  implies  the  adoption  of  a  consistent  monetary 
discipline  with the aim  of creating  an  area  of real  stability 
in the Community but which at the same  time requires  the 
adoption of measures to help the weaker countries to respect 
14 the more  rigid economic  discipline  implicit in the monetary 
system  through  an  adequate  transfer  of  real  resources.  In 
the last analysis, the historical significance of the Community 
can  only  be  judged  on  its  ability  to  promote  unceasingly 
economic  and  social  progress  and  to  bring,  in the  process, 
the member countries and their regions into closer harmony. 
Apart from the numerous technical problems and alterna-
tives  which  reflect  previous  disappointments  or the variety 
of  positions  or interests  of each  of  the  participants,  I  feel 
that  a  number  of  questions  have  to be  answered  in  these 
crucial weeks. 
In spite of  the obstacles  to be overcome  and  the  diffi-
culties which arise, are the reasons for proposing the European 
Monetary System,  which were  not purely  abstract  or based 
on the individual interests of a particular country or currency, 
still valid or will  the present suggestions  of putting off  the 
proposals  gain  ground? 
Recent experience of  the economic and monetary upsets 
of the 1970's, the still precarious position of certain economies 
and  the structural backwardness  of  the  regions  of some  of 
the Member States compared to the more advanced industrial 
industrial societies, lead many to think that immediate moves 
towards full  European monetary union are hazardous. 
The reasons  for  this uncertainty are understandable, but 
from  a political point of view  I  feel  that if some  countries 
decided  to remain  outside  the system  they  would be facing 
even  greater  risks  by  not  participating  in  the  constituent 
phase  of  European  monetary  union.  What  is  more,  they 
would  have  to  cope  with  these  dangers  with  less  support 
from  their Community partners. 
There  are  certain  conditions  which  must  be ful'filled  if 
the political will to join the EMS  is  to become a reality. 
I think I am right in saying that flexibility is the essential 
component  of  the  technical  mechanisms  so  that  all  the 
member  countries  can  join  the  monetary  system  from  the 
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agreement  is  very  necessary  to  redress  economies  which  at 
present  show  a  propensity  to  wide  variation  in  the  rates 
of  inflation.  During  this  two  or  three  year  period  the 
practical  machinery  for  coordinating  exchange  policies  and 
economic  policy  in  general  will  have  to  take  account  of 
these  differing  initial situations,  allowing  the national  auth-
orities  a  certain  flexibility  in  the  application  of  economic 
policy measures.  In the transitional period economic policies 
within the Community must gradually come closer together. 
The resources released in a country which is fighting inflation 
should find  an  outlet on the markets of the other members 
to prevent a levelling down or a deflationary movement, and 
to ensure throughout the Community a higher lever of growth 
and  a  gradual  reduction  in inflation. 
At world level,  the continuing instability on  the  money 
market  means  that  the  European  Monetary  System  is  still 
very much to the point.  Efforts to create an area of monetary 
stability,  if  successful,  will  have  favourable  effects  on  a 
wider  front.  In  other  words  the  creation  of  an  orderly 
monetary  system  in  Europe  which  reduces  excessive 
divergencies  and  provides  a way  of absorbing  the surpluses 
of  certain  countries,  could  help  the  United .States,  Europe 
and all  those concerned in one way  or another to solve the 
problem  of  the  dollar  which  is  likely  to  persist  for  some 
time yet. 
The second question is whether it is possible or desirable 
to solve  the problems of the weaker countries  by a specific 
or implicit  acceptance  of  a  two-speed  Europe. 
There has  been talk of  a  two-tier  monetary  system  but 
I  feel  that this view does  not take account  of the fact  that 
the situation is likely to develop.  A two or three-tier Europe 
should  not  be  seen  as  an  orbital  system  with  the  strong 
countries  at  the  centre  and  the  others  following  a  wider 
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apart. 
The economies  of the various  Community countries will 
certainly move at different speeds  towards the aim of mone-
tary unification because of their different economic and social 
situations.  But they  should at least attempt to move  all in 
the same direction so that their efforts will be complementary 
and  help  them  along  the  road  to  rapid  and  balanced 
development.  In order to bring the  speeds  of  the various 
countries  closer  together  we  will  need  practical  measures 
to  bring  about  a  better  balance.  These  measures  are  at 
present  being  studied  by  the  appropriate  experts  (the  so-
called  concurrent  studies)  and  are  an  integral  part  of  the 
EMS proposals, complementing its more specifically monetary 
aspects. 
The  third  question  concerns  Italy  more  directly.  Our 
problems are related to the doubts of those who fear future 
disappointments and the hopes  of those who would like  to 
reconcile  membership  of  the  monetary  system  with  the 
development  of  technical  solutions  which  might  lead  to 
laxist policies  and thus in practice to a rejection of member-
ship or of compatibility with the system.  There is  no doubt 
that Italy must join the European Monetary System. 
The fi.rst  real  condition  for  this  step  is  to ensure  that 
internal  decisions  and  policies  are  consistent  with  out 
commitment to Europe. Although the reduction of inflation, 
a return to growth, the reduction of unemployment and the 
strengthening  of  production  are  essential  conditions  if  we 
are  to  participate  as  equals  with  our  partners  in  Europe, 
the key  to  the solution of  these  problems  lies  in our own 
hands.  Choosing  Europe  means  choosing  certain  policies 
which  will  gradually  enable  us  to  put the  Italian economy 
on  a  sound  footing. 
The declarations of intent to move  towards membership 
do  not  seem  to  be  matched  by  the  behaviour  of  certain 
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Community  level  talks  are  going  on  to  create  favourable 
conditions  for  Italian  membership,  within  Italy  there  are 
forces  at  work,  knowingly  or  unknowingly,  to  make 
membership  impossible  in  practical  terms.  And  yet,  there 
is  an  enormous  amount at stake. 
We  need  a  great  political  debate  to  make  Italians 
understand that the Community rules are binding and require 
us  to  make  sacrifices  now  if we  are  to  build  a  better 
tomorrow  with  our  European  partners.  This  is  the  path 
we  must  follow  even  though  it  is  beset  with  difficulties, 
as  is  the current political situation in Italy. 
The question of the enlargement of the European Com-
munity to include the three Mediterranean  countries  which 
have  applied for  accession  is  the second  major  topic facing 
the European Community.  It cannot be treated in isolation 
from  the first  topic  for  if  a  solution  is  not found  to  the 
economic  question  the  enlargement  towards  the  Mediter-
ranean could lead to a potential break up of the Community 
if it were not accompanied by greater economic union. 
The  enlargement  of  the  Community  is  a  very  complex 
matter  as  regards  the  technical  aspects  of  the  negotiations 
but  a  relatively  simple  and  uncontroversial  one  in  basic 
political  terms.  The Nine have  to come  to terms  with  a 
political fact - the desire for membership expressed by Spain, 
Greece  and  Portugal  - which  does  not  allow  for  delaying 
tactics  or ambiguity. 
The preamble to the treaties of Rome clearly provides for 
an  open  Community  with  membership  open  to  European 
countries which share the original countries' ideals of peace 
and freedom and have pluralist political, economic and social 
democratic  systems.  Any  rejection  of  applications  by 
European countries who qualify for membership in this way 
would  not  only  run  counter  to  the  commitments  of  the 
Treaty but also  discredit the very principles on which later 
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achievements  were based  and  thus  damage  the fundamental 
interests of its members. 
There  would  not  only  be  a  dramatic  loss  of  political 
credibility in the Nine's efforts towards integration but those 
efforts  would  lose  their  essential  impetus  if the  idea  of 
restricting  the  Community  to its  present  boundaries  gained 
ground.  There is  no  doubt that the permanent  absence  of 
Spain, Greece and  Portugal would in the long  term damage 
the very  identity  of  the Community  ideal. 
The  contribution  to  European  civilisation  which  these 
countries  have  made  throughout  their  long  history  - a  no 
less  valid  contribution  than  that  made  by  the  existing 
members  of  the Community - is  such  that if they  did not 
join the ranks of those contributing to the ideals and culture 
of  the Community,  it would  automatically  be  lowering  its 
sights  and  be  destined  to become  a  mere  regional  trading 
area. 
Without  the  contribution  of  the  Mediterranean  area, 
Europe - and thus the Community - would be incomplete. 
Politically  and ideologically,  too,  the exclusion  of  these 
three young democracies would expose them to a serious risk 
of  destabilization  which  would  be  dangerous  not  only  for 
their democratic institutions but also for  the general growth 
of  democracy  in  our  continent.  This  concerns  the  Nine 
directly since by their constant opposition they contributed to 
the  downfall  in  these  three  countries  of  the  authoritarian 
regimes. 
The  need  to  pay  the  greatest  attention  to the  dangers 
facing  these three countries is  demonstrated by the anxieties 
expressed  publicly  by  their  leaders  about  the  difficulty  of 
achieving the policial consensus on which their governments 
are  founded  and  about  the  disastrous  effects  of  any  long 
and not fully  justified economic  and political isolation from 
Europe.  If Europe  rejected  the  almost  miraculous  gift  of 
new  democratic  stability  on  its  southern  front  and,  by 
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and political unrest in that region, it would be  committing a 
monumental error.  It would leave room for  external forces 
willing  to move  into the area,  it would  bring  prospects  of 
further  crises  on  top  of the ones  we  are  experiencing  now 
and would have consequences  for  the balance between East 
and  West and  the development  of  detente. 
But it is  not just a question of protecting the democratic 
values which we share, it is  also a matter of the Community's 
external image. 
With the accession of the three new countries the parallel 
system  of  political  cooperation  among  the  Nine  (the 
foundations of which were laid in the Report on Cooperation 
in  1970) will have to be expanded accordingly.  The contri-
bution  of  the  Three  will  bring  a  new  dimension  to  the 
political image  of  Europe internationally  and  indirectly will 
enrich each of the Nine member countries. 
The contribution which Greece will be expected to make 
to  our common  political heritage would be  in the direction 
of greater cohesion on our southern flank and closer attention 
to  Balkan  affairs.  Spain's  contribution would be its  Latin-
American  contacts  and its  traditionally  close  links  with the 
Arab  world.  For  Portugal  there  would  be  the  Atlantic 
dimension  and  its  experience  of  affairs  in  Africa  which  is 
finding  a new  relationship with a democratic Portugal.  All 
these contributions will certainly increase Europe's presence 
in  the  world  and  give  the  Nine - or rather  the Twelve -
not only greater weight in looking after their own interests 
but also greater influence in world affairs.  By coming closer 
to  the  real  dimensions  of  the  continent,  the  Community 
would .  coincide  more closely  with the European component 
of  the  Atlantic  Alliance  thus  paving  the  way  for  a  re-
assessment of Europe's role and the European dimensions in 
the alliance. 
It would be better fitted  to fulfill  the role envisaged  by 
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States  with  equal  rights  and  duties,  to  protect  the  values 
and common interests of both sections of the western world 
both on the purely political level and as  regards security. 
These,  then,  are  the  main  benefits  from  a  political, 
ideological and cultural viewpoint which the current members 
of the Community  would  derive from  a  smooth  and  sound 
expansion.  However, this welcome for the three applications 
does  not and  should not mean  uncritical  acceptance  of  any 
and every condition which is  placed on accession. 
The  question  of  the  terms  of  entry  cannot  be  settled 
globally but only  after close  consideration of  all  the aspects 
involved.  It is  a complex question  as  it involves  problems 
in  economic,  social  and  institutional fields  which  will  have 
to be  faced  up  to by  both  sides  - and  as  far  as  we  in 
particular  in  the Nine  are  concerned  - with full  awareness 
of  all  their  implications,  favourable  and  unfavourable.  The 
negotiations must therefore be conducted in  an  ordered and 
clear manner. 
These  are  - in brief - the  main  points  to be borne in 
mind and the difficulties  which are likely  to arise. 
The  present  Community  has  259  million  inhabitants. 
In  1985  when,  presumably,  the  enlargement  to  twelve 
members  will  be  complete  it  will  have  322  million 
inhabitants (compared  with a  population of  280  million  in 
the  Soviet  Union  and  234  million  in  the  United  States). 
Its economic  weight  in  the world  will  then  be superior  to 
that  of  the  United  States,  Japan,  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Canada  together.  But its  economic  structures  will  be less 
uniform than those of the present Community of Nine.  The 
three  applicant  countries  have  a  much  lower  level  of 
development than the Community average. 
To  bring  about  greater  uniformity  in  the  development 
of the Twelve and to solve  the complex social and economic 
problems which already exist in the Nine, we will thus need 
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growth  are  not  very  optimistic,  either  for  the  present 
Community or for the applicant countries.  This could mean 
that the already difficult path towards economic and monetary 
union  in  the  existing  Community  will  encounter  greater 
obstacles  and  more  complex  problems. 
The change from  a Community of Nine to a Community 
of  Twelve  will  involve  an  increase  in  the  importance  of 
agriculture  and  of  those  employed  in  agriculture  in  the 
economic  and  social  framework  of the Community. 
Yields  per hectare,  at  present  lower  than in  the  Com-
munity,  particularly  in Spain  and  Portugal,  the  possibility 
of increasing irrigation and the increase in prices of Mediter-
ranean  agricultural  products compared  to those  in  force  in 
the Community could lead to an increase in  the production 
of fruit,  vegetables,  wines and olive oil  and  the prospect of 
the  creation  of  surpluses  in  some  Mediterranean  products, 
accompanied by  a reduction in the surpluses of some  of the 
products of the existing Community, since the three applicant 
countries are  net importers of  these products  and will  thus 
be  obliged  to  buy  them,  at  different  prices,  on  the  Com-
munity market. 
If these forecasts are confirmed they will alter the nature 
of the problems  facing  Community  agriculture,  shifting  the 
balance  towards  the  south  and  creating  new  support for  a 
review  of  the Mediterranean  agricultural  policy. 
As  the balance of agricultural interests is  shifted towards 
the south,  Italy  and  the whole  Mediterranean  area  will  be 
supported in their demands for a Mediterranean policy. 
In industry, too, the Three will have problems in adjusting 
their  customs  duties  for  the  Community  countries  and  for 
other  countries  and  the  enlarged  Community  as  a  whole 
will  have  difficulties  in adapting  sensitive  industries  to  the 
new  problems  of competition. 
In the regional  sector  the imbalances  within  the  Com-
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domestic  product  between  the  poorest  region  of  the  Nine 
- the West of Ireland - and  the richest  region - the State 
of Hamburg - which  at  present is  of the order of one  to 
six,  will increase to one to twelve when the  poorest region 
of  the  Twelve  becomes  Villa  Real,  Braganza,  in  Portugal. 
It will  then  become  economically  and  politically  vital, 
even  more  so  than  at  present,  to restore  balance  between 
the regions  and to transfer resources from  the richer to the 
poorer regions,  a problem  to  which insufficient  attention is 
paid  at  present. 
Equally important are the economic  and social problems 
which  enlargement  will  raise  in  connection  with  wages  in 
industry in the Nine and in the Three:  the Nine will suffer 
from  competition  and  the  Three  from  the increase  in  pro-
duction  costs. 
But  of  course  it is  to be expected  that  problems  will 
arise. 
In assessing  the advantages  and disadvantages  we  must 
bear in mind the impetus that will derive from  the gradual 
unification  of a market of more than three hundred million 
people  and  the sharing  of  new, diversified  resources. 
This necessarily succinct and therefore incomplete review 
of the problems posed by the enlargement of the Community 
means  that we  must  stress  as  clearly  as  possible  that it is 
not only  in the interests  of  the Nine but it is in fact  their 
duty to open the doors of the Community to these countries, 
and we must then embark on serious  negotiations in which 
the sacrifices  which each side will have to make are directed 
towards  a  consistent  development  of  the  process  of  inte-
gration. 
Hisory has taught us that no political, economic, cultural 
and  social  expansion  of  the  Community  is  possible,  while 
preserving  its  identity,  without  a  simultaneous  or  rapid 
strengthening of the process of unifying the component parts 
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will  have  to  bear  this  in  mind. 
The third of the decisions to be taken by the Community 
in  this  period  fraught  with difficulties  but fruitful  in new 
ideas  and  hopes  concerns  the  institutions.  This  is  usually 
taken  to mean  the direct  elections  to the European  Parlia-
ment,  perhaps  rightly  so. 
These  elections  certainly  represent  a  turning  point  in 
European history, since the process  of creating the Commu-
nity is  thereby moved at least partially away from secret and 
uncontrolled  decision-making  at  the  top  and  more  towards 
direct  participation  by  the  people. 
Even  though  the  election  campaign  will  bring  to light 
opinions both for and against  the process  of unification  and 
among those in favour there will be various opinions on how 
it is  to be achieved, nevertheless there is  no doubt that this 
democratic confrontation among  the public at first  and later 
in Parliament will give a new impetus both to the Community 
institutions and to  the Governments of the Member States. 
But it would be short-sighted to limit the whole problem 
of the institutions solely  to elections to the Europea Parlia-
ment,  however  important  these  may  be,  or  to  discussions 
on its powers. 
There are five reasons why this problem is  a much wider 
one: 
1) The new impetu's given to the aim of economic and 
monetary union  means  that we  need institutions capable of 
laying  down  monetary  rules  and  providing  for  effective 
coordination  of  economic  policies. 
The Werner Working Party has  already submitted plans 
for a Community institutional structure based on a decision-
making centre for economic policy responsible to the directly 
elected Parliament and a Community system of central banks 
the nucleus of which would initially be formed by the Euro-
pean  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  (FECOM). 
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accepted.  The President of the Commission of the European 
Communities, Mr. Jenkins, spoke here about the creation of 
a  new  major  authority  to  manage  exchange  rates,  external 
reserves  and the broad outlines of internal monetary policy. 
The  proposals  at  present  being  discussed  turn  on  the 
extent  to  which  the  moving  of  a  currency  towards  the 
margins  of fluctuations  should constitute merely  a  signal  to 
begin  discussions  on  intervention  measures  and  economic 
policy measures, or else an automatic obligation to intervene. 
This  debate  between  those  who  support  an  automatic 
system and  those who prefer a signal  to start consultations, 
which  implicitly involves  the rejection  of  any  authority,  by 
its very nature confirms the need for such an authority either 
within  the  framework  of  the  existing  institutions,  which 
would be  endowed  with  special  powers,  or by  altering  the 
institutions  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  new  tasks.  It is 
sufficient  to mention the need for  a major transformation of 
the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund  to enable  it  to 
administer  a  portion  of  the  reserves  of  the Member  States 
and to issue a European currency, albeit with the initial role 
of a  special  drawing  right  for  settling  transactions  between 
the  central  banks. 
2) The principle of the enlargement of the Community 
has  been  accepted  and  we  have  seen  above  the  political 
reasons  for  this.  Serious  and  thorough  negotiations  should 
be able to resolve the economic and  social problems.  Those 
who  have  long  experience  of  Community  life  know  the 
difference  between  the  functioning  of  a Community  of  Six 
and the role the Community institutions played in this context 
and  the  operation  of  the  enlarged  Community  of  nine 
members  with  the  role  of  the  current  institutions  in  this 
broader context.  This difference arises  both from  the more 
cumbersome nature of the decision-making process  and from 
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Community of Nine. 
One can then wonder, and many  highly qualliied people 
are  wondering,  what  will  happen  to  the  operation  of  the 
existing  institutions  in  a  Community  of  Twelve  and  how 
effective the decision-making process can be among countries 
with even greater disparities. 
3)  The elections to the European Parliament and con-
sequently  the  creation  of  a  more  politically  representative 
Assembly with a direct European mandate raises the problem 
not so much of the powers of the Assembly as of the powers 
of the bodies with which it will  have  to deal  and  of their 
ability  to  act  in  a  consistent  and  politically  responsible 
manner  and  to guarantee  continuous  and  constructive  rela-
tions  with the Assembly. 
4) Over the twenty years of operation of the existing 
institutions there have been two processes  going on side by 
side.  On the one hand the enlargement of the Community, 
the  development  of  policies  of  integration  and  a  constant 
series  of  problems  arising  from  the  crisis  have  made  the 
institutions  incapable  of  coping  with  the  new  conditions. 
On the other hand, while Parliament, within the framework 
of  the  Treaties,  and  additional  agreements,  has  assumed  a 
greater role in Community life both through the conciliation 
procedure and through its substantial budgetary powers, the 
Community role of the other institutions has been weakened. 
The  Commission,  through  no  fault  of  its  own  but rather 
through  action  by  the Governments,  has  had its  powers  to 
make proposals and to provide an impetus to the Community 
diminished.  Its independence has  suffered  from  an  internal 
process  of re-nationalization which has  certainly reduced its 
Community role.  The Council of Ministers has  come  to be 
more  the representative of national governments  and  hence 
more  of  a  forum  for  intergovernmental  bargaining  and  by 
acting in  separate  sectors  of Community activity often kept 
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quite distinct (Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Farm 
Ministers,  Council  of  Finance  Ministers)  has  often  let  its 
action become uncoordinated and unilateral. 
5) The failure of the institutions to develop has meant 
that  while  European  institutions  have  remained  at  a  rudi-
mentary  stage  with  limited  powers,  many  problems  on  a 
continental  scale,  particularly  economic  problems,  are  dealt 
with  by  international  bodies,  some  private  (financial  and 
producer  organizations),  which  are  to  a  large  extent  not 
responsible to the citizens of Europe nor subject to national 
control  and  this  has  led,  in  the  past  and  even  now,  to a 
considerable  weakening  of  the  democratic  nature  of  the 
system. 
All these reasons, together with a growing awareness  of 
the problem, echoed by the President of the French Republic 
in his  proposal  for  ' three  wise  men '  which has  made  the 
question even more topical,  suggest  a number of reflections 
which, while not hoping to solve the problem, can serve as 
a guide. 
The first  relates  to the need  to base  our considerations 
of  the  problem  of the  institutions  on the Treaties,  on  the 
preservation  of  the  principles  they  contain  and  of  the 
achievements  which  have  been  based on  their ideals.  We 
must correct the distortions produced by political expediency 
or  routine,  reassess  each  of  the Community  bodies  in  the 
light of experience and use all  the powers contained in the 
Treaties without fear of making innovations which are in line 
with the highest  Community  ideals. 
The advent of direct elections to the European Parliament 
has  opened  discussions  about  its  powers.  No member  of 
the  directly  elected  Parliament  will  want  to  overstep  the 
bounds of his  mandate but, while the  views  of  those  who 
want  to make  the  new  Parliament  into  a  Constituent  As-
sembly deserve attention, we cannot accept the view of those 
who wish,  by an  agreement  between  the  Governments,  to 
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framework  of  the existing Treaties  or the  agreements  com-
plementing them. 
The  general  principle  of  respecting  what  is  called  the 
'acquis communautaire' is  particularly important as  regards 
the role of the Commission.  As the Community is  enlarged 
it becomes  increasingly important to safeguard not only  the 
unifying role of the Parliament but also the independent and 
active role of the Commission,  in the spirit of the Treaties 
of Rome.  As  the role  of  the Council becomes  increasingly 
complex  as  a result of the greater diversity  of geographical 
areas,  economic  and  social  conditions  and  varying  political 
tendencies  which  will  be  represented,  so  the  Commission 
must  be  given  the  power  to  propose  solutions  capable  of 
advancing  Community  policies  and  integration  policy  in 
general.  To this end consideration should be given not only 
to the membership of the Commisison in terms  of numbers 
but also  to a closer relationship  with Parliament  as  regards 
both its appointment and its supervision. 
As  for  the Council of Ministers the main problem is  to 
strengthen the Community spirit, while respecting its role of 
representing the Governments.  This cannot be achieved solely 
or  primarily,  as  some  believe,  by  abandoning  the principle 
of  unanimous  voting so  much  as  by  strengthening  relations 
between the Commission and the Council so that they work 
more closely  together. 
Consideration should also be given to ways of preventing 
the Community policies  from  being dealt with separately  or 
in  isolation  from  one  another by  the Council.  Lastly,  we 
must  reconcile  the  desire  of  individual  Member  States  to 
hold the presidency of the council periodically with the need 
for  greater  continuity  in  the  work  of  the  presidency  and 
thus greater efficiency particularly as  regards the maintenance 
of continuous relations between the president of the Council 
of Ministers  and  the European  Parliament. 
28 Closely  linked  with  this  concept  is  the  position  within 
the institutional framework  of the European Council  which 
now meets regularly and takes political decisions which affect 
the  normal  development  of  Community  life,  in  budgetary 
decisions  for  example.  This  poses  problems  for  relations 
with  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  raises  the  question  of 
whether  and  to  what  extent  it is  attempting  to  become  a 
potential ' European executive '. 
All  these  questions  are  of great  interest  and  constantly 
raise the problem of preserving national identities within the 
context of relations with the developing supranational bodies 
and of the need for decentralization to bring the State closer 
to  the daily  lives  of ordinary  people. 
However, it is  our duty  in  the  short  term  to consider 
the more practical, if less impressive subjects  which concern 
the decisions we have to take now on economic and monetary 
union, enlargement and the birth of a directly elected Euro-
pean  Parliament. 
29 STAMPATO  A  FIRENZE 
NEGLI  STABILIMENTI  TIPOGRAFICI 
«E.  ARIANI »  E  «  L'  ARTE  DELLA  STAMP  A» 
FEBBRAIO  1979 